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Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private
Law Values
Gregory S. Alexander
ABSTRACT: Property theorists commonly suppose that property has as its
ends certain private values, such as individual autonomy and personal
security. This Essay contends that property’s real end is human flourishing,
that is, living a life that is as fulfilling as possible. Human flourishing,
although property’s ultimate end, is neither monistic nor simple. Rather, it
is inclusive and comprises multiple values. Those values, the content of
human flourishing, derives, at least in part, from an understanding of the
sorts of beings we are―social and political. A consequence of this conception
of the human condition is that the values that constitute human
flourishing—property’s ends—are public as well as private. Further, the
public and private values that serve as property’s ends are mutually
dependent for their realization. Hence, any account of property that assigns
it solely to the private sphere, categorically removed from public values, is
incoherent.
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INTRODUCTION
Donald Lamp was outraged. Every morning since 9/11, the eighty-nine
year old World War II veteran had hung an American flag from the balcony
of his Omaha, Nebraska apartment. But in May 2004, the management
board of the retirement community in which he lives ordered him to remove
his flag, citing a violation of one of the covenants in the master plan that
governs the development. Lamp refused.
These sorts of disputes are not uncommon in homeowner associations.
What made Donald Lamp’s case noteworthy was the fact that he was the
father-in-law of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, a fact
apparently of little moment to the association’s general manager. “We have
a lot of important people here,” she said. However true that may be, Lamp’s
case got national attention, much of it unfavorable for the homeowner
association. A typical reaction was this posting on a blog site: “Donald Lamp
fought for our right and his right to display our nation’s flag anywhere and
anytime.”1
The question, of course, is, does Mr. Lamp have such a right? On one
view, a view informed by the private law values of property law, the answer,
quite clearly, is no. The covenant restricting the display of flags within the
development was included in Mr. Lamp’s deed. He had legal notice, either
actual or record notice, of it at the time he entered into the purchase of his
unit, and he agreed to be bound to it. The matter is strictly one of consent.
So long as he had notice of the restrictive covenant at the time he entered
into the agreement with the association, he is bound by it.2
Donald Lamp and his supporters did not see the matter this way. To
them, some values cannot be contracted away. These are fundamental
values—public values—and among them is the right to display the American
flag. So the argument goes.
The dispute between Mr. Lamp and his homeowner association is not
aberrational. There have been many such disputes, some litigated, some not,
over conduct ranging from speech to religion to satellite antennas. Although
not all of these disputes involve values that could plausibly be characterized
as fundamental (the right to hang a clothesline outdoors?), many of them
do. The question is whether such values have any traction in the realm of
private ordering.
I want to approach this question in a somewhat unusual way. In the
United States, the usual approach to the question is through public law,
notably the American constitutional doctrine of state action. Under this
doctrine, constitutional values do not apply unless there has been state

1. Yoe, Comment to Nebraska Retiree Fights to Hang American Flag, FOX NEWS (May 28,
2004, 5:00 PM), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1144102/posts.
2. See Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1353, 1356–57 (1982).
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action, i.e., unless the actor responsible for the restriction or other action in
question is a government agency or otherwise acting under the authority of
the government. Constitutional norms and their attending values do not
apply to strictly private actions.
That approach has been singularly unhelpful. It asks under what
circumstances it is appropriate for public law norms and their underlying
values to intrude upon the domain of private volition, replacing that
sphere’s own distinctive set of values with its own. There are two related and
contestable assumptions here. The first, and more familiar, assumption is
that there is a categorical separation between the public and private spheres.
The second assumption is perhaps less obvious—that a similar sort of
distinction exists between the values which inhere in the norms regulating
the two spheres, indeed that the differences between the two sets of values
are such that there is, or at least may be, a basic level of incompatibility
between them. It is this second assumption that I wish to challenge. I argue
that not only are the values that inhere in public law norms compatible with
the values that serve as the normative foundation of private property, but
further that such public values may be necessary for realization of private
property’s ends.
This Essay operates at both a conceptual and a normative level. At a
conceptual level it seeks to elucidate the normative basis of the private law of
property. In particular, it explicates how, as a conceptual matter, the private
values of property relate to and interact with property’s public values so that
the two dimensions cohere rather than conflict. At a normative level, I argue
that even if one rejects the interpretation of property as resting on a moral
foundation of human flourishing, understood as constituted by multiple
values, both public and private, the human flourishing theory represents the
best approach to develop a morally pluralistic theory of property that relates
multiple public and private values, which are commonly seen as in conflict,
as coherent and mutually supportive.
The normative foundation of private property, I argue, is human
flourishing. I understand human flourishing to mean that a person has the
opportunity to live a life as fulfilling as possible for him or her. This account
of human flourishing is morally pluralistic; that is, it rejects the notion that
there exists a single, irreducible, fundamental moral value to which all other
moral values may be reduced. However, the theory is also objectivist, and
does not claim that value determinations are simply matters of agent
sovereignty. Thus, the theory conceives of human flourishing as including
(but not limited to): individual autonomy, personal security/privacy, selfdetermination, self-expression, and responsibility (along with other virtues).
The thesis of this Essay is that these values, the values that theorists take to
be among the intended ends of private property, are not in conflict or
incompatible with fundamental public values. Rather, these values, at times,
require recognition of public values for property’s own values to be realized.
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Stated differently, human flourishing, understood as morally pluralistic,
includes both private and public values. From this perspective, then, the
relationship between private property and public values should be seen as
symbiotic rather than antagonistic.
This insight has cash value. Most immediately, it enables a wide array of
disputes like Donald Lamp’s—disputes that appear to require the
intervention of the state though its medium of public law, in either statutory
or constitutional form—to be resolved solely on private law grounds without
resorting to state involvement (other than as the facilitator for dispute
resolution through its courts). Specifically, there is no need for the state to
become directly involved in these private two-party disputes in order to
operationalize the values that public law expresses. For example, as I shall
later discuss, many of the public accommodation cases that were decided on
constitutional or statutory grounds could have been resolved in favor of a
right to public accommodation solely on private law grounds.3 Private law is
sufficiently capacious to include public law’s values and to operationalize
them itself.
Another, broader implication of the Essay’s thesis is that it helps explain
why property owners owe obligations to others, expressed by what I have
elsewhere called the social obligation norm of property.4 Further, it helps
explain why this social obligation norm is internal to the concept of
ownership itself rather than the obligations being externally imposed on
owners by the state. What may at first blush appear extrinsic is in fact
intrinsic to private law norms. Finally, this Essay’s thesis helps explain the
limits of those obligations. Property rights, the obligations that inhere in
property ownership, and the limits of those obligations all derive from the
same source—human flourishing. Both the rights and the obligations of
property are necessary as means of realizing human flourishing.
To illustrate how public values advance the values underlying private
property, the values that comprise human flourishing, I shall discuss two
problems that have been the subjects of considerable discussion in
American-property legal literature in recent years: the right to exclude and
the enforceability of restrictive covenants in homeowner associations.
I begin in Part I with an account of human flourishing, which is the
moral foundation of private property. The discussion of human flourishing
paves the way for understanding property’s ends—the private law values that
undergird it. These values are what Part II undertakes to explain. Part III
then shifts attention to the public values that are, at least at times, necessary
for realization of human flourishing. Those values include, among others,
equality, inclusiveness, community, participation, and self-constitution. Part

3.
4.

See infra text accompanying notes 126–31.
See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 748 (2009).
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IV is the core of the theory. It explains how the public values help realize the
private values of which human flourishing is partly constituted. Under the
theory, human flourishing comes to be seen as a project in which public and
private cannot be categorically distinguished from each other but blend into
each other and mutually support each other. Part V illustrates the theory by
discussing two sets of property disputes in which asserted private property
rights have been challenged on the basis of appeals to public values:
controversies over servitudes that restrict certain personal freedoms in
homeowner associations and limits on private land owners’ right to exclude.
I.

HUMAN FLOURISHING: A PLURALIST CONCEPTION

The conception of human flourishing that I shall use here must be
distinguished from welfare, as that term is used in modern legal and
economic analysis. Welfare is a quite confusing and imprecise term. We
often use it in such a way as to suggest that it refers to one single thing, i.e.,
one single value. But a moment’s reflection should indicate that it does not.
Welfare is a term that we commonly use to refer to several different values
such as pleasure, health, safety, satisfaction, and so on. However, this is not
the sense in which economists and law-and-economics scholars, who focus
on welfare-maximization, apparently use the term.
To see this, consider a set of distinctions made famous by Derek Parfit a
number of years ago. Parfit usefully distinguished among three types of
theories of how a person’s life can go maximally well: (1) hedonistic
theories, which suppose that what makes a person’s life go best for him is
what makes him happiest; (2) desire-fulfillment theories, which provide that
the good for a person is what fulfills his desires; and (3) objective-list
theories, according to which “certain things are good or bad for us, whether
or not we want to have the good things, or to avoid the bad things.”5
Welfarism, in the law-and-economics sense, trades on a version of the second
of Parfit’s three theories, a version that we can call the preferencesatisfaction theory.6 It supposes that there is one and only one value—
maximization of preference satisfaction. All other values can be reduced to
that single, irreducible value. In this respect, welfarism, as a moral theory, is
a monistic value theory.7
Modern legal-welfare theory sometimes supposes that welfare and
human flourishing concepts are synonymous. But they are not, at least not
in the senses in which they use the term welfare and the way I shall use the
concept human flourishing. The term human flourishing is, of course, a
translation of Aristotle’s term eudaimonia, which is often, but misleadingly,

5.
6.
7.

DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 493 (1984).
See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 18–24 (2002).
I discuss value monism and pluralism in Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property,
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017 (2011).
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translated as happiness. Human flourishing is a better translation for
multiple reasons, not the least of which is that it is conducive to a pluralist
understanding, whereas happiness is less so.
In contrast to welfare, as welfarists use that term, human flourishing, as
I shall use the term, is a value-pluralist concept. The conception of
flourishing upon which I shall rely denies that human flourishing is a
genuinely unitary value. Indeed, the theory here denies that there are any
genuinely unitary values at all. There are many ways for a person’s life to
flourish,8 and there are many values that are constitutive of human
flourishing, or the well-lived life.
In addition to being value-pluralist, the conception of human
flourishing adopted here is also an objective theory. It rejects the view that
what is good or valuable for a person is determined entirely by that person’s
own evaluation of the matter. Human flourishing is not purely a matter of
agent sovereignty.9 That is, the theory holds that claims about what is
prudentially valuable for a person can be objectively right or wrong, rather
than solely a matter of someone’s evaluative perspective.10 In this respect,
the theory is an objective theory of the good.
Any list of values that are constitutive of human flourishing will
necessarily be contestable.11 I shall identify several values that I believe will
be relatively less controversial than others though some may be more
contestable than others. At any rate, for present purposes, let us stipulate to
an acceptable, although incomplete list of values that are constitutive of
human flourishing. Among the values that I shall discuss are autonomy, selfrealization, personhood, community, and equality.
As these values indicate, the conception of human flourishing upon
which I shall draw here is, broadly speaking, Aristotelian. It is based on
Aristotle’s understanding of human character as inherently social.12 Life
within a society and webs of social relationships are necessary conditions for
8. This is not to say that all forms of living are equally well-suited to flourishing, or that
whatever life a person chooses to pursue is one that maximizes his well-being. That view of
flourishing would collapse the very distinction that I wish to maintain here—the distinction
between welfarism (as the maximization of preference satisfaction) and human flourishing.
Some ways of living are better than others, objectively so, regardless of one’s preferences. I
cannot develop this point in this Essay.
9. See Richard J. Arneson, Human Flourishing Versus Desire Satisfaction, 16 SOC. PHIL. &
POL’Y 113, 116–17 (1999).
10. Id. As Arneson points out, however, this does not mean that an individual’s attitudes
are irrelevant in evaluating what is good for her, i.e., what will make her life go well. Id. at 140–
41. For example, one good for a person may be that her most important life aims, as she ranks
them, be fulfilled.
11. The value-pluralist approach to human flourishing taken here is similar to Douglas
Rasmussen’s. See Douglas B. Rasmussen, Human Flourishing and the Appeal to Human Nature, in
HUMAN FLOURISHING 1, 40–41 (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1999).
12. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 15, 263–67 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962) (c. 384
B.C.E.); ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 7–9, 110–13 (Ernest Barker ed. & trans., 1976).
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humans to flourish, i.e., for human lives to go maximally well. The
conception adopted here rejects interpretations of human character—the
sorts of beings we are—as what is often described as atomistic. The
interpretation of human character upon which my conception of human
flourishing is based sees humans as dependent upon each other literally
from birth through death.13 They depend upon each other in a wide range
of matters, from health to education to practical reasoning to socialization.
The core values that I have identified reflect humans’ sociability and
inherent and unavoidable interdependency.
II. PROPERTY’S ENDS
Private property is instrumental; it serves particular ends. Precisely what
those ends are is, of course, a highly contestable matter. I argue that the best
instrumental account of property is one that expresses property’s ends in
terms of human flourishing. In this Part, I identify five private law values that
are at the core of human flourishing and that are commonly considered to
be among property’s main ends—autonomy, personal security/privacy, selfdetermination, self-expression, and personal responsibility. Although this is
by no means an exhaustive list, it captures those values that I take to be
central to the instrumental fit between property and human flourishing.
A. AUTONOMY
Autonomy will perhaps be the least controversial of the five values.
Many, if not most, property theorists identify individual autonomy as an
important value that property serves. Among property theorists, some,
notably libertarians and Kantians, place autonomy at the core of property’s
raison d’être. But even those who do not view autonomy as the foundational
end of property still view it as an important aspect of the justification for
private property rights.14 This is true even of utilitarianism and its latter-day
cognate, welfarism.
It is sometimes said that utilitarianism is a collectivist theory (and so its
justification of property).15 On this view, autonomy would appear to play a
little role as justification for property. The justification of property would be
strictly confined to collectivist matters, namely, net social utility. But Jeremy
Waldron convincingly argues that this is a mistaken view of utilitarianism.16
What the utilitarian wants to maximize, Waldron reminds us,17 is the
individual’s satisfaction (or, in welfarist terms, preferences). It is precisely
13.

See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN BEINGS NEED

THE VIRTUES (1999).

14.
(1996).
15.
16.
17.

See Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 345–48
See H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 200 (1983).
See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 73–79 (1988).
Id. at 74.
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because the utilitarian takes the individual’s own definition of his or her
satisfaction as given that the utilitarian is committed to personal autonomy.18
Autonomy was the main justification for property in civic republican
theory as well. From the republican perspective, the function of private
ownership of property (land, in particular) was to remove the citizen’s
dependence on others so that he could practice virtuous citizenship.19
Property ownership bestowed self-reliance on a person, which facilitated the
practice of virtue in the civic realm by assuring that one’s judgment was
unencumbered by economic obligations to others. Property, then, provided
autonomy, facilitating participation in the public sphere rather than security
from it.
Variations of the republican version of the autonomy argument for
property have appeared in recent years. Charles Reich’s famous “New
Property” theory, for example, developed a somewhat different strand of the
argument.20 More recently, Frank Michelman developed a version of the
autonomy argument that had a distinctly redistributive twist.21 All citizens
should have a voice in the political order, he argued, and, following
republican principles, political voice requires autonomy that can be
provided only by property. In modern society, however, such political
autonomy through property can be secured only through government
redistribution of property.22
B. PERSONAL SECURITY/PRIVACY
Property, it has long been thought, provides a person a safe haven.23 As
Jeremy Waldron observed, “[h]umans need a refuge from the general
society of mankind.”24 Property, especially landed property, supposedly
provides that refuge to its owners.
Privacy is an important aspect of the security that is thought to result
from private ownership of property. The connection between privacy and
18. My use of the concept of personal autonomy should be distinguished from individual
freedom, at least in the sense in which Jedediah Purdy uses it. Purdy develops a sophisticated
pluralistic conception of freedom that is constituted by three values—reciprocity, responsibility,
and self-realization. See JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY,
AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 112 (2010).
19. See generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776–1970 (1997); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN
TRADITION (1975).
20. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
21. Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72
IOWA L. REV. 1319 (1987).
22. See id. at 1329–30.
23. See Carol M. Rose, Book Review, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 238, 240 (1993) (reviewing
JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS (1992)).
24. WALDRON, supra note 16, at 296.
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property is familiar, of course. The home, for example, is perhaps the most
familiar nexus between property and privacy. Indeed, the home is the locus
classicus linking property, security, and privacy with autonomy (or
freedom).25 Waldron argues that individuals need not just “a house, a flat, or
a room of one’s own” for “a place where they can be assured of being alone,
if that is what they want, or assured of the conditions of intimacy with others,
where intimacy is called for.”26 What they specifically need is a “household”;
moreover, it must be a “household of their own.”27
Personal security includes not only physical protection but protection
from other forms of insecurity as well, such as financial insecurity and
political insecurity. Charles Reich was worried about just these forms of
insecurity when he attacked the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in the
notable case of Flemming v. Nestor28 as “resembl[ing] the philosophy of feudal
tenure.”29 As Reich wrote, “Just as the feudal system linked lord and vassal
through a system of mutual dependence, obligation, and loyalty, so
government largess binds man to the state.”30 The difference between
feudalism and government largess, according to Reich’s account, is that
there is no mutuality in the relationship between the individual and the state
with respect to government largess.31 As the decision in Flemming makes
abundantly clear, the recipient of government largess is utterly dependent
on the state. Nestor’s insecurity, resulting from the Court’s refusal to treat
his benefits as constitutional property, could hardly have been made clearer
than by the facts that not only was his only regular source of income cut off,
but the federal government saw fit to deport him to his native country
because of his past affiliation with the Communist Party.32
The connection between property and individual security can be made
in a more metaphysical sense as well. Nineteenth century Hegelian theorists
considered the basic “rationale of property . . . [to be] that everyone should
be secured by society in the power of getting and keeping the means of
realising a will.”33 The meaning of security here is less tangible perhaps than

25. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 56–57 (1993).
26. WALDRON, supra note 16, at 296.
27. Id.
28. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). In Flemming, the Court held that a federal
statute cutting off a retiree’s old-age benefits under the Social Security Act because the retiree
used to be a member of the Communist Party was not an unconstitutional taking of property
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 612. Despite the
fact that Nestor, the retiree, had paid into the Social Security system for years, the Court
reasoned that his benefits did not constitute an “accrued property right.” Id. at 608.
29. Reich, supra note 20, at 769.
30. Id. at 769–770.
31. See id. at 770.
32. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 621 (Black, J., dissenting).
33. THOMAS HILL GREEN, LECTURES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION 220
(The Lawbook Exch. Ltd. 2005) (1895).
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earlier senses of security, but it shares the same ideas that property performs
a kind of protective function and that this protection enables individuals to
do certain things.
C. SELF-DETERMINATION
The link between property and self-determination is established most
clearly perhaps in Hegel, but it is evident in other theories as well, such as
the civic republican tradition. In Hegelian theory, self-determination is
closely related to freedom.34 Indeed, for Hegel, freedom is selfdetermination. Hegel’s own conception of self-determination is rather
metaphysical, but Alan Brudner offers a more accessible version of it in
these terms: Self-determination is, Brudner argues, “a power to act from
determinate ends that are themselves coherent expressions of freedom
because they are neither adopted unreflectively nor imposed by an external
will.”35 Here is another take on the Hegelian notion of self-determination:
“When we . . . view[] our desires as material to be regulated and ordered in
line with desires of a higher order still (for example the desire not to be the
kind of person we see ourselves being or becoming) we reach a clearer
understanding of the slippery concept of self-determination.”36
The connection between this understanding of self-determination and
property comes through in the notion of ordering our desires. Because we
live in communities with others, we will use our property in pursuing our
considered goals, but we do so “in full recognition” of others’ legitimate
claims to respect.37 Ordering our desires also means that in pursuing our
goals through property, we will develop and rely on a system of norms
regulating the scope of property rights.38
The point to emphasize about this approach to self-determination is
how social it is. Self-determination cannot occur atomistically or in isolation
from society. Self-determination is a process that is deeply dependent upon
community for its higher and higher realization.
D. SELF-EXPRESSION
Self-expression is perhaps not a value that is obviously associated with
private ownership of property, but it is nevertheless one of property’s
important ends. By “self-expression,” I mean to include a capacious range of
forms and senses in which people assert themselves. At property law’s most
basic level, for example, possession constitutes, as Carol Rose reminds us, a

34. See ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE COMMON LAW: STUDIES IN HEGELIAN
JURISPRUDENCE 97–98 (1995).
35. Id. at 98.
36. Dudley Knowles, Hegel on Property and Personality, 33 PHIL. Q. 45, 54 (1983).
37. Id. at 57.
38. Id.
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mode of communication.39 “Possession as the basis of property ownership,”
Rose suggests, “seems to amount to something like yelling loudly enough to
all who may be interested.”40 It is a matter of communicating a claim in a
particular sort of way, a mode of expression that carries a great deal of
meaning regarding the claimant’s psychological attachment to the object in
question.
Possession is hardly the only nexus between property and selfexpression. Jeremy Waldron argues that there are three larger connections
between self-expression and property.41 First, we can understand the
connection between property and self-expression in terms of a person’s
assertion against nature. It is not only Hegel who viewed nature as, to borrow
Alan Ryan’s phrase, “blankly material,” “hav[ing] no point or purpose of
[its] own.”42 This was Locke’s attitude toward nature as well, and many
moderns share it. From this point of view, people give purpose to nature by
asserting themselves over it. Self-expression in this context involves
participation in projects through which individuals plan and exercise
control over some aspect of the general endeavor.43
A second mode of connection between self-expression and property is a
person’s assertion of herself against others.44 This mode of the connection is
most evident perhaps in the market, where “forces of competition” is
another term for networks of conflicting yet coordinated acts of selfassertion. By asserting oneself against others in market transactions, a
person may or may not be seeking domination over the other. Self-assertion
may, but need not, result in domination where both parties are engaged in
acts of self-assertion for mutual gain. Whether domination results depends
upon the circumstances of their interaction, in particular, the power
relationship between them.
The third mode of connection between self-expression and property
that Waldron identifies is slightly more nuanced than the first two. Waldron
states the connection this way: “Since ownership rights impose constraints
on the behaviour of others, my having these rights involves others’
recognizing me as a source of moral constraint and thus as a locus of
respect.”45 The idea here is that the fact that others are willing to restrict
their pursuit of their own desire in the interest of my freedom gives me a
greater appreciation of my freedom.46 In particular, it permits me to see and

39. See CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND
RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 14 (1994).
40. Id. at 16.
41. See WALDRON, supra note 16, at 302–03.
42. ALAN RYAN, PROPERTY AND POLITICAL THEORY 122 (1984).
43. See WALDRON, supra note 16, at 302.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 303.
46. Id.
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gives me confidence in the social dimension of my freedom.47 As Waldron
points out, however, systems of private property are not unique in this
respect.48 Successful common property regimes must do so as well in order
to enable cooperative behavior.49 Still, the social coordinating benefits of
private property are well-known.
E. RESPONSIBILITY
Private property can be seen as serving and promoting different
virtues.50 Here, I want to focus on one virtue in particular—responsibility.
The connection between property ownership and personal responsibility
can be developed on the basis of diverse strands of thought. One is the
tradition of positive liberty.51 From this perspective, a person is not truly free
until his desires, plans, and goals are stabilized so that there is continuity
between the plans and actions of his past and those of his future.52 The
person who acts on the basis of whim, who flits from one impulse to another,
is not truly free but instead is a hostage to such unstable urges. Such a
person has no real sense of enduring identity. Even his moral agency is
subject to doubt.
Private ownership of property, the argument goes, fosters a deeper
sense of freedom by stabilizing a person in particular ways. The idea is that a
regime of private ownership inculcates in individuals a sense of personal
responsibility because they realize that they must effectively manage their
own property if they are to satisfy their own needs. Through ownership,
individuals acquire not only certain skills but, more important, particular
habits of thought—forward-looking, calculating, and mindful of
alternatives—that free them from caprice and whim and give them an
understanding of what T.H. Green called the “permanent good.”53
Another strand of thought connecting property with responsibility
focuses less on responsibility to oneself than responsibility to others. There is
a very old tradition of property theory that is concerned with the
responsibilities that individual owners owe to their societies. Connected with
ideas of ownership (especially of land) as stewardship, the tradition dates

47. Id.
48. Id. at 303–04.
49. Id.
50. See generally Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821 (2009)
(discussing both economic and Aristotelian analyses of land use and ownership).
51. See WALDRON, supra note 16, at 310–13; see also PURDY, supra note 18, at 112–13
(analyzing responsibility as constitutive of freedom and connected to property through
freedom).
52. See WALDRON, supra note 16, at 307–08.
53. GREEN, supra note 33, at 7.
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back at least to Biblical texts.54 In modern versions of this tradition, some
theorists have argued that a social obligation is inherent in the concept of
ownership itself.55 Other recent theorists have similarly argued that
“[o]wnership entails not only the granting of rights but also the adoption of
obligations.”56 Moreover, these theorists have argued, “[s]ome obligations
on owners of property toward nonowners are morally justified even when
this entails some measure of sacrifice of self-interest.”57
The idea that owners owe responsibilities to their societies is a major
theme in property theory in many legal systems. In Latin America, for
example, there is an important tradition in property legal theory
emphasizing the “social function of property.”58 This tradition, whose origins
are usually traced to the French legal theorist Leòn Duguit,59 views property
not in terms of a right but rather as a social function.60 Not only does the
owner owe responsibilities to put the property to the service of the
community, but also the state should protect property only to the extent that
the owner fulfills this social responsibility.61 This version of the socialresponsibility theory goes considerably beyond that articulated by recent
American property theorists, whose theory remains within the scope of
liberalism.
III. THE PUBLIC VALUES OF HUMAN FLOURISHING
This Part discusses some of the values that constitute the public
dimension of human flourishing. Living a life that goes maximally well for
each of us is not a strictly private or solitary endeavor. Part of the reason lies
in our character as social beings. Another part lies in our inherent
dependency on others for nurturing those capabilities that are essential to
human flourishing. This dependency embeds each of us in various
overlapping and sometimes shifting communities, including obvious ones
such as families, co-workers, and friends, but also less obvious, more
attenuated communities, such as neighborhoods, municipal communities,
political communities, spiritual communities, and the like. Our
54. See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Toward a Property Ethic of Stewardship: A Religious Perspective, in
PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 21 (Charles Geisler &
Gail Daneker eds., 2000).
55. See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 44 (2011); Alexander,
supra note 4, at 748.
56. JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 17 (2000).
57. Id. For a contrary view, see DAGAN, supra note 55, at 143.
58. See generally M.C. Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of Property: Duguit, Hayem, and Others,
22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 191, 207 (2010).
59. See UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 20, 31–33 (2000).
60. See Sheila R. Foster & Daniel Bonilla, The Social Function of Property: A Comparative
Perspective, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2011).
61. Id. at 1004–05.
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embeddedness within, and dependency upon, these multiple and various
communities means that human flourishing implicates another set of values,
values that are usually considered public rather than private in character.
This Part identifies five such public values. Part IV will then explain why
these nominally public values are in fact internal to the private law of
property and thus are constitutive of property’s ends.
A. EQUALITY
Equality is, of course, a notoriously ambiguous term. I am using it here
not in the sense of equality of resources or any material respect but in the
Kantian sense of equal dignity. By virtue of our humanity alone, we are all
entitled to being treated as moral agents of equal dignity and worthy of
equal respect. A life characterized by degrading treatment and disrespect by
others is not a life that can be said to go maximally well. A flourishing life
means, if anything, one that is marked by those forms of treatment given to
people whom others regard as ends rather than means.
There is a close relationship between the conception of equality that I
am using here and community. Specifically, the idea of equality used here
views the whole point of equality as living within a community in which
everyone is treated with equal respect. Even more specifically, the
community of equals is one that seeks to realize the political and moral ideal
of non-subordination. It is a community that has no truck with social
hierarchies or social stigmas that mark some individuals as inherently
inferior to others. There are no social relations based on perceptions of
inherent superiority and inferiority among people.
By contrast, the inegalitarian society, the society based on principles of
subordination, is one in which the proper social order is regarded as a
hierarchy of human beings, based on their intrinsic worth. From such a
perspective, inequality refers, as Elizabeth Anderson puts it, “not so much to
distributions of goods as to relations between superior and inferior
persons.”62 In modern societies social ranking has many bases, including
vestiges of slavery and imperialism, race, gender, caste, class, disability,
ethnicity, and others. Equality-as-non-subordination means simply that all
such bases of social ranking, in the sense of evaluating some human beings
as inherently inferior to others, are illegitimate. The egalitarian community,
then, is one in which all persons are treated as equals in this sense.
B. INCLUSIVENESS
Closely related to equality but distinct from it is inclusiveness. It means
the opportunity to join with others in groups or communities for various
reasons. If sociality characterizes the sorts of beings we are, then

62.

Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 312 (1999).
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inclusiveness—the opportunity to join and to belong—must be available to
individuals in order for their lives to go maximally well.
The antithesis of this value is exclusion. There are, of course, many
varieties of exclusion. I will mention only three here—social, political, and
physical. Others are relevant to inclusiveness, but these three varieties of
exclusion best illustrate my point.
Social exclusion occurs when individuals or groups are denied rights or
opportunities that are normally available to all other members of society.
Here we see the close relationship between inclusiveness and equality, for
the grounds of social exclusion commonly coincide with bases of
subordination, including race, ethnicity, religion, caste, and gender.
Social exclusionary practices may be formal or informal. Some are
legally sanctioned, while others persist despite formal legal condemnation.
Some are direct; others are more subtle. Lior Strahilevitz provides
illuminating examples of these more subtle exclusionary practices in his
study of what he calls “exclusionary amenities.”63 Consider, Strahilevitz says,
the effect of golf courses as an amenity offered in common interest
communities during the 1990s. At the time, very few African Americans
played golf,64 so the golf course is a proxy for race. This has enabled
developers of common interest communities to offer housing that effectively
satisfies a preference for residential racial homogeneity. Similarly, real estate
brokers continue to use a practice known as “red-lining” to steer African
Americans away from certain urban neighborhoods to keep them exclusive
or predominately in racial composition, even though federal statutory law
has long since declared that practice illegal.65
By political exclusion, I mean the inability to participate fully in the
political community as a result of barriers established, formally or
informally, by the polity’s leadership or by its political culture. Many
societies have practiced political exclusion through a variety of tactics, some
straightforward, others quite subtle. Some forms of political exclusion have
been tied to property ownership itself—and even where property ownership
is not a condition of political inclusion, for example, it is not a condition of
citizenship—non-ownership may still frustrate or impede effective political
inclusion.

63. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV.
437 (2006).
64. During the period from 1994 to 1995, only 3.1% of all Americans who played golf
were African Americans. See R. Jeff Teasley et al., Recreation and Wilderness in the United States 22
(Univ. of Ga. Dept. of Agric. & Applied Econ., Working Paper No. FS 97-13, 1997), available at
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/16643/1/fs9713.pdf.
65. See generally Richard R.W. Brooks, Covenants & Conventions (Nw. Law & Econ. Research
Paper Series, Research Paper No. 02-8, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=353723.
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Physical exclusion refers to all forms of interference or obstruction that
deny individuals or groups physical access to facilities or areas otherwise
open or available to the public. Forms of interference or obstruction may be
(indeed, commonly are) indirect, such as stairs for a person in a wheelchair.
There may be no intent to exclude persons who are physically disabled or
incapacitated in such cases, but the result is the same. Such persons are
effectively excluded from fully participating as members of the broader
community. They cannot experience the same sense of belonging that
others experience. Even simple activities that fully abled persons take for
granted, such as going to the movies, may be denied to someone lacking the
capacity to walk or to climb stairs.
As I discuss in Part V, the relationship between inclusiveness and
property is complex. In practice, private ownership has been ambivalent
between inclusion and exclusion, in the three senses in which I am using the
term exclusion here. Historically, of course, and indeed, still today, the
reality is that private ownership has been used as a keenly effective
mechanism for social, political, and physical exclusion. At the same time,
however, property can be equally effective as a mechanism for inclusion,
particularly social inclusion. As Eduardo Peñalver importantly observes,
“private ownership can serve as a powerful vehicle for tying individuals more
closely to their respective social groups.”66 In this respect, the relationship
between property and inclusiveness overlaps with the next public value that
contributes to human flourishing—community.
C. COMMUNITY
Like inclusiveness, community as an aspect of human flourishing grows
out of our inherent sociality. The understanding of the socially rooted self
means, among other things, that “the identity of the autonomous, selfdetermining individual requires a social matrix.”67 Humans are inevitably
dependent upon social groups, some chosen, some not, not only for their
health and even survival, but also their very status as free and rational
agents.68 Communities are the mediating vehicles through which humans
acquire the requisite capabilities to become free and rational agents.
Moreover, as free and rational agents, humans never cease to operate within
the matrices of multiple communities in which they find themselves
throughout their lives.69
Unlike the utilitarian conception of community, which regards
community in strictly instrumental terms, i.e., as a means to satisfy individual
66.
67.

Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1940 (2005).
CHARLES TAYLOR, Atomism, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL
PAPERS 2, at 187, 209 (1985).
68. See Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127, 138–41 (2009).
69. Id. at 138–39, 143–44.
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preferences, the Aristotelian conception views community as constitutive of
the self. Community is necessary for the well-lived life because the self’s very
identity requires participation in social groups. Asked who we are, we
invariably talk about the communities into which we were born and in which
we were raised. We discuss our nation, our family, our friends, where we
attended school, our religious community or similar groups, and social
clubs. Indeed, individuals and their various and multiple communities
interpenetrate each other to such an extent that they cannot be entirely
separated from each other.70
The connection between property and community is probably clearest
in Hegel, in whose work property stands squarely at the intersection between
the individual and the state.71 Hegel’s theory established a constitutive
relationship among private property, personal identity, and community.
Hegel’s greatest contribution to our understanding of property was to show
not only how property anchors our free will in the actual world of objects
but, more fundamentally, to explain how property does the work of
establishing social relationships. The whole point of his theory of personality
and freedom was to show how a person develops into a member of an ethical
community in the actual world. Hegel believed that the will that is free for
itself was intelligible only in the context of concrete human existence. As J.E.
Penner states, “[f]reedom is situated in human society.”72
The connection between property and community is hardly limited to
Hegel. Utilitarianism, for example, recognizes the connection, albeit
through a rather thin conception of community. According to
utilitarianism’s strictly instrumentalist account, community is valuable just
insofar as it contributes to maximizing aggregate utility. It is never an end or
value itself.
Hanoch Dagan provides a much richer account of community as one of
property’s important values. Dagan’s conception of community is at once
constitutive and liberal.73 It is constitutive in the sense that “communities are
important human goods exactly because they are so significant to the identity
of individual people.”74 It is liberal insofar as it retains the right of members
to exit from their communities and so preserves individual autonomy.75
As Part V discusses, community is a problematic value for property
because of community’s exclusionary character. “Communities by their very

70.
71.

Id. at 138–39.
See Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Introduction to PROPERTY AND
COMMUNITY, at xvii, xvii (Gregory S. Alexander and Eduardo M. Peñalver eds., 2010).
72. J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 172 (1997).
73. See DAGAN, supra note 55, at 142–44.
74. Id. at 143.
75. Id. at 66–69.
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nature exclude.”76 This is the core dilemma that community poses for liberal
property. Because of its inherently exclusionary character, community
threatens to undermine other values that property serves, most
conspicuously, inclusiveness. As I further discuss in Part V, human
flourishing requires some means of mediating the tension between these
values.
D. PARTICIPATION
The claim that participation is essential to the well-lived life is most
commonly associated with Aristotle and with the republican tradition.77
Within this theoretical tradition, participation means public participation—
the vita activa. Participation as a public value need not be so narrowly
defined, however. We can understand participation more broadly as an
aspect of inclusion. In this sense participation means belonging or
membership, in a robust respect. Whether or not one actively participates in
the formal affairs of the polity, one nevertheless participates in the life of the
community if one experiences a sense of belonging as a member of that
community.
Formal citizenship alone is insufficient to confer on a person a sense of
belonging. Citizenship rings hollow when one can legally be excluded from
places that are generally open to the public or when one has no meaningful
opportunity to express one’s opinion about issues that affect one’s daily life
practices or when one is legally disempowered from participating in all of
the society’s legal and social institutions (e.g., marriage). It was precisely to
cover such situations that the term “second-class citizenship” was coined.78
And it was precisely to eliminate such badges of second-class citizenship in
the United States that statutes such as Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,79 the main federal public accommodations statute, were enacted.
Arguably, citizenship not only is not a sufficient condition of belonging;
it is not a necessary condition either. In some cases, resident aliens, although
legally barred from certain formal acts of participation, notably by voting,
may experience a greater sense of belonging than some citizens. Resident
aliens who are members of groups that historically have not experienced
domination or oppression may feel more welcome in places open to the
public and may be more robustly enabled to participate in the community’s

76. Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and
Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 52 (1989); see Jeremy Waldron, Community and Property—For
Those Who Have Neither, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 161, 188–92 (2009).
77. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 12; POCOCK, supra note 19.
78. See generally Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social
Meanings, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267 (2011).
79. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000a-6 (2006). On public accommodation laws and their
relationship to property, see Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations
and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1450–77 (1996).
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social practices. For example, in many respects life in the United States has
been and to a considerable extent remains far easier for a Green Cardholding white citizen of the U.K. than for an African American. Aside from
formal methods of political participation, more forms of participation in the
life of the community may be open to such resident aliens than to African
American citizens, especially in certain parts of the U.S.
E. SELF-CONSTITUTION
By self-constitution, I mean the identity and sense of purpose that a
person constructs for his life. Another term that might be used is “selfinterpretation.” Self-constitution is closely related to the modern concept of
personhood. It is not simply a psychological phenomenon but a moral value
as well, for there are better and worse ways in which to develop and to
interpret the self. This is why personhood is a moral concept, and in the
same sense, so is self-constitution.
Self-constitution is not only a moral value but also a public value. This is
so because, as Margaret Jane Radin observes, “self-constitution takes place in
relation to an environment, both of things and of other people.”80 Radin
continues, “This contextuality means that . . . social contexts are integral to
the construction of personhood.”81 Charles Taylor puts the point somewhat
differently. He states: “[L]iving in society is a necessary condition of . . .
becoming a moral agent in the full sense of the term, or of becoming a fully
responsible, autonomous being.”82 Self-constitution occurs in part through
interactions with others; it is not solely an act of self-will. More specifically, it
occurs as a dialogic process between the self and society.
Taylor has offered a nuanced account of this dialogical process. He
contends that self-constitution is, in the first instance, a matter of selfinterpretation, offering a conception of humans as “self-interpreting
animals.”83 By that he means that the self is “[a] being who exists only in selfinterpretation.”84 Individual selves, that is, are constituted, at least in part, by
their own self-interpretations. Taylor adds, however, that these selfinterpretations are not entirely a matter of our own doing. They are
conducted in what Taylor calls “webs of locution.” He explains: “The
community is also constitutive of the individual, in the sense that the selfinterpretations which define him are drawn from the interchange which the
community carries on. A human being alone is an impossibility, not just de
facto, but as it were de jure.”85
80.
81.
82.
83.
(1985).
84.
85.

RADIN, supra note 25, at 138.
Id.
TAYLOR, supra note 67, at 191.
CHARLES TAYLOR, HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS I, at 45
Id. at 3.
Id. at 8.
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The dialogical character of self-constitution explains why it is a public
(or social) value as well as a private value. Indeed, self-constitution clarifies
why a strong opposition between public and private is so misleading. The
self is both constituting and constituted: Both the private and the public
realms are necessary for the constitution of the self.
IV. WHY, WHICH, AND WHEN PUBLIC VALUES ARE AMONG PROPERTY’S ENDS
We live in multiple worlds. We inhabit worlds of the family, the home,
the workplace, the market, the political arena, and other realms of human
activity, and each of these realms may have multiple sub-realms. The world
of politics, for example, for some people may include sub-realms ranging
from the blogosphere to the union hall to a neighborhood civic association.
These multiple worlds are not always distinct—commonly, they overlap with
each other. The worlds of the home and politics, for example, may overlap
with each other if, for example, a person lives in a condominium that is
regulated by an owners association. The worlds of the family and the market
sometimes overlap; think of family-owned businesses, for example. Our
multiple worlds of activity commonly overlap with and blend into each other
such that we cannot realistically isolate one from the other, each with its own
discrete set of values.
The overlapping and blending of our multiple worlds means that there
is no separating, in any sort of categorical fashion, the public and private
spheres, with their attending sets of values, from each other. When the
different sets of values that attend different realms of human existence,
public and private, encounter each other, conflicts between or among
private and public values will sometimes occur. We cannot always avoid such
conflicts between or among multiple relevant values by simply assigning
values to separate “spheres of justice”86 or separate institutions.87 We do not
live our lives so neatly compartmentalized as to permit that.
Encounters between public and private values are not bound to
produce conflicts, however. This is the point on which I wish to focus in this
section: how human flourishing depends upon both public and private
values. More specifically, the discussion in this Part focuses on how the
private values that are property’s ends require values that are usually
regarded as public for their realization. Hence, encounters between private
and public values, far from producing conflicts, involve mutually supportive
engagements such that the relationships between private and public values
are symbiotic.
The upshot of this symbiotic relationship is that many nominally public
values, including the values discussed in Part III, are internal to private law

86.
87.

See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).
See DAGAN, supra note 55, at 72–74.
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and are constitutive of its ends.88 Because of our overlapping social spheres,
which implicate both the public and private, values such as equality and
community have a Janus-faced character. They operate in both realms, being
neither exclusively public nor private. When they work in tandem with more
strictly private values, such as personal autonomy, they properly belong
among private law’s ends. When courts draw upon these values in
adjudicating disputes between private parties, they draw upon private law’s
internal resources rather than impose values that are exogenous to private
law.
At the same time, values that are usually considered to be public in
character do not always function in this way. Values such as equality and
community are internal to private law and are among property’s ends just
insofar as they are necessary to enable other, conventional private law values
to be realized. To the extent that conventional public values are not needed
to enable fulfillment of one or more traditional private law ends, then those
values remain exogenous to private law.
Just what does it mean to say that fulfillment of a traditional private law
end requires one or more conventional public values? Consider first the
private law value of individual autonomy. Every major liberal theory of
property gives special place to autonomy as a justification for private
property rights. Two theories—Kantianism and libertarianism—identify it as
property’s foundational end. Even utilitarianism and its modern variant,
welfarism, indirectly recognize the special contribution of personal
autonomy to overall social well-being, whether defined in terms of utility or
wealth. No one would dispute that autonomy is at least a component of
property’s ends.
But autonomy is not self-realizing. We are not born as autonomous
agents. We depend upon others to help us develop those capabilities that
enable us to function as independent practical reasoners. As Alasdair
MacIntyre states, “To become an effective independent practical reasoner is
an achievement, but it is always one to which others have made essential
contributions.”89 We enter the world utterly dependent on others for our
physical survival, but our dependence on others doesn’t end with infancy or
even with childhood. Even upon reaching adulthood, we continue to place
at least partial physical dependence (and even emotional or psychological
dependence) on others as we move through a dangerous world. Often, little
more than dumb luck separates the independent adult from the dependent
one. And, as we reach the final years of our lives, the possibility of physical
dependence once again looms ever larger.

88. See Hanoch Dagan, The Limited Autonomy of Private Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 809 (2008);
Hanoch Dagan, The Public Dimension of Private Property (Apr. 20, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2045487.
89. MACINTYRE, supra note 13, at 82.
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Our dependence on others to develop autonomy goes beyond sheer
physical dependence. MacIntyre observes:
What we need from others, if we are . . . to develop the capacities of
independent practical reasoners, are those relationships necessary
for fostering the ability to evaluate, modify, or reject our own
practical judgments, to ask, that is, whether what we take to be
good reasons for action really are sufficiently good reasons, and the
ability to imagine realistically alternative possible futures, so as to
be able to make rational choices between them, and the ability to
stand back from our desires, so as to be able to enquire rationally
what the pursuit of our good here and now requires and how our
desires must be directed and, if necessary, reeducated, if we are to
attain it.90
This kind of nurturing and this sort of capability development is carried
out through communities, through networks of family members, friends,
teachers, and others who constitute the multiple social spheres of our lives.
Individual autonomy can be acquired only within a vital matrix of social
structures and practices. Its continued existence and exercise depends upon
a richly social, cultural, and institutional context, and the free and
autonomous individual must rely upon others to provide this context.
Communities are the mediating vehicles through which we come to
acquire the capabilities we need to flourish and to become fully socialized
into the exercise of those capabilities. As free, rational persons, we never
cease to operate within and depend upon the matrices of the many
communities in which we find ourselves in association. Each of our identities
is inextricably connected in some sense to others with whom we are
connected as members of one or typically more communities. Our identities
are literally constituted by the communities of which we are members. Asked
who we are, we inevitably talk about the communities where we were born
and raised, our nation, our family, where we attended school, our friends,
our religious communities, and clubs. Indeed, individuals and communities
interpenetrate one another so completely that they can never be fully
separated.
If autonomy depends upon community for its realization, the opposite
is true as well. That is, community requires personal autonomy as well.
Hanoch Dagan has written persuasively about the important role that
individual autonomy plays in realizing a conception of community that
avoids oppression. “This conception [of community],” Dagan writes, “is
premised on the insight that communities are important human goods
exactly because they are so significant to the identity of individual people.”91

90.
91.

Id. at 83.
DAGAN, supra note 55, at 143.
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Dagan points out that for community and autonomy to work together in this
mutually supportive fashion, “members’ identification with [their]
communit[ies] and their commitment to [the communities’] goals should
never erase their individual identity.”92 When community denies personal
autonomy by erasing individual identity it inhibits rather than promotes
human flourishing. A person whose community denies her personal
autonomy cannot develop the capability for independent practical
reasoning, which is essential to a well-lived life.
Consider another private value commonly given prominent place in
property theory—personal security. One reason why the right to exclude
looms so large in discussions of what private ownership involves is the
intuition that private ownership of property protects people insofar as they
have the right to exclude others out from their personal dwelling. “A man’s
home is his castle” expresses an aspiration of security, among other values.
The connection between property and personal security applies not only to
land, but also to money and intangible forms of property as well. For
personal security includes financial security as well as physical security.
Like autonomy, personal security cannot be fully realized in isolation
from other values, including public values. Consider the relationship
between personal security and equality. Though hardly apparent at first
glance, the relationship between the two values is in fact mutually
dependent, as the relationship between autonomy and community is. If we
understand equality in terms of non-domination or non-subordination, then
the relationship between personal security and equality is perhaps more
readily perceived.
To illustrate the relationship, imagine a married woman whose husband
routinely beats her after returning home from a night of drinking. This is,
unfortunately, not just a story but the all-too-real existence of many women
around the world. Why do they not leave their husbands, people often ask.
Especially with respect to women in the advanced countries of the West,
where unmarried women are ostensibly less encumbered by cultural taboos
and other restrictions, people often find it difficult to understand why
married women in such circumstances remain with abusive men. The
answer, or at least part of the answer, I think, lies in the link between
personal security and equality, or in this context, between personal
insecurity and inequality. Women in abusive marriages often do not leave
their husbands because they feel unable to do so; they feel trapped and tied
to their abusers, unable to free themselves.93
Such women are paradigmatic examples of what I mean by having
unequal status, or living unequally. Their marriages are characterized by

92. Id.
93. See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,
90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 61–63 (1991).
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domination.94 Their husbands have effectively subordinated them in a deep
and profound sense that bears some resemblance to a master–slave
relationship. In such a relationship, the woman can hardly feel physically
secure. Part of what personal security means in a relationship is the
knowledge that one’s partner will treat one with respect in a physical sense.
Personal security is meaningless within a relationship in which one is
dominated in multiple respects, including physically, by the other.
Relationally, security requires equality among the parties to the
relationship. It may also require equality in a financial sense as well,
depending upon the relationship. Consider marriage again. Hanoch Dagan
insightfully analyzes marriage as an “egalitarian liberal community” that
brings together three values—community, autonomy, and equality.95
Dagan’s conception of equality reflects the same notion of nonsubordination that I have used here,96 but he also uses an equality-of-goods
conception when he analyzes marital property law. Regarding that law, he
argues, “[t]he core of the[] background rules [should be] the rule of equal
sharing of the marital estate broadly defined.”97 The reason he gives for this
core rule reveals the connection between equality-of-resources and security.
Dagan states, “[t]his rule aims to ameliorate the intrinsic vulnerability that is
an inextricable part of long-term relationships of trust and cooperation.”98
What Dagan refers to as “the inevitable vulnerability” is what I have been
discussing in terms of personal insecurity. Dagan seems correct in arguing
that vulnerability goes with the territory in any relationship of trust and
cooperation. But vulnerability—personal insecurity—is a matter of degree,
and in relationships of inequality, in the sense of power subordination or
resource imbalance (or both), there is a good deal more vulnerability than
where the parties deal with each other as equals operating at arms-length
from each other, as in a long-term contract between two merchants.
Vulnerability and inequality go together, hand-in-glove. This is why equality,
a public value, is necessary for the realization of personal security, one of
property’s important private ends.
The dependency of security on equality is empirical, not conceptual. It
is conceivable that there are or have been unequal relationships in which
the subordinated party enjoys personal security. Hierarchical social
relationships do inherently create vulnerability, but the dominant party may
not exploit that vulnerability. If it is not, personal security is possible. To be
sure, this is a somewhat tenuous form of personal security insofar as there
remains a risk that the dominant party will take advantage of the
94. See id. at 53–60; see also James Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives?, in FEMINIST
PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 133, 155 (Kersti Yllö & Michele Bograd eds., 1988).
95. DAGAN, supra note 55, at 200.
96. See id. at 206.
97. Id. at 208.
98. Id.
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opportunity to exploit. But some degree of vulnerability is always
irreducible, even under conditions of equality. I may become the victim of a
bad person or a tragic accident. A standard of no vulnerability for personal
security is too demanding to be realistic or workable. As an empirical matter,
however, it seems plausible to suppose that the degree of vulnerability
increases substantially for subordinated or dominated persons.
Facilitation between security and equality works the other way around as
well. That is, personal security promotes equality (again, as nondomination). Equality between persons in which one party is subject to
ongoing harm or degradation of some sort (or the threat thereof), such as
through physical or emotional abuse or massive financial loss, seems false. A
relationship between two equals is one that is between two individuals each
of whom can, speaking metaphorically, stand on her own two feet.99
In general terms, the public values contribute to, indeed are part of,
property’s ends because of the kind of beings we are. If we understand, as
Aristotle does, our character as social animals, then any conception of
human flourishing that draws upon an interpretation of human character,
as mine does, must likewise emphasize the social dimension of human
flourishing. This means that human flourishing cannot be strictly a private
matter, a matter of becoming an autonomous agent who enjoys personal
security and is self-determining in isolation from particular communities
and from society more broadly. From the neo- (or quasi-) Aristotelian
perspective, human flourishing, affected as it is by the social character of
human beings, must itself be a social as well as an individual matter.
Moreover, human flourishing is not a matter of simply the two dimensions—
the social and the individual—together; rather, it is a matter of those two
dimensions inevitably working together in mutually supportive ways. This is
why the public values, which are the values that attend the social dimension,
must be part of property’s ends along with the private values. Let me unpack
this theory a bit with some preliminary observations and assumptions that I
need to acknowledge but cannot defend here.
First, in arguing that what human flourishing involves is affected by
human character, the neo-Aristotelian approach taken here should not be
understood as reductive or essentialist. It is important to emphasize that the
approach does not adopt an essentialist theory of human nature. It does not
assume that there is some inner “me” that is waiting to be “discovered.” Nor
is it premised on a physicalist version of natural law. Rather, it is premised
on an interpretive rendering of the human condition, a hermeneutic
approach to understanding what makes us human. This account at once

99. One might imagine a relationship between two individuals who both are insecure in
some relevant sense, say, between two battered women who seek each other’s company for
solace. Wouldn’t such a relationship be one between equals? This is a false sense of equality, it
seems to me. It is a relationship between comparables, but not between equals.
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emphasizes our individuality and our position within a society. These two
characteristics of the human condition— autonomy and membership—are
not opposed to each other but mutually constitutive. They are so through a
process that is best termed “dialogical.” We need dialogue and interaction
with others in order to constitute and to understand ourselves. There is no
end to this dialogue, no final self that, once constituted or discovered,
remains unchanged.
Although what human flourishing involves is based on an
understanding of the human condition, that understanding does not dictate
the terms of human flourishing. That is, it does not specify what values must
be included on any list of human flourishing. Still, although an
interpretation of the human condition does not dictate the specific content
of human flourishing, it does set the boundaries of the contents and limits
of human flourishing.100
The neo-Aristotelian understanding of the human condition adopted in
this Essay emphasizes the social character of human beings. This view
contrasts sharply with the conception of the human condition that lies at the
heart of the classical social contract tradition. The basic premise of social
contractarianism is the idea that, at least in theory, there exists a pre-social,
rational human agent who is capable of entering into a contract.101 When
Aristotle said, “The man who is isolated—who is unable to share in the
benefits of political association, or has no need to share because he is
already self-sufficient—is no part of the polis, and must therefore be either a
beast or a god,”102 he was expressing the fundamentally opposed view that
we are always-already socially situated.103
Our lived experience and our own observations give us good reasons to
think that Aristotle was right and to reject the social contractarian view of
the human condition. As I have already indicated, autonomy is not selfrealizing. In our own lives, we do not possess from infancy the capabilities
that are part of what it means to be an autonomous agent. We learn those

100. See Rasmussen, supra note 11, at 32.
101. The social contractarian view of the human condition is one that emphasizes the
isolated character of each person. This latter interpretation of the human condition was
perhaps most evident in the doctrines of some of the classical social contract theorists (e.g.,
Hobbes) and their successors, a conception that often goes today under the infelicitous term
“atomist.” Atomism presents a view of human nature that stresses the self-sufficiency of
individuals. See TAYLOR, supra note 67, at 189. In this context, self-sufficiency refers not to the
ability of a person to survive alone in the Great Wilderness, but to the question whether living
in society is a necessary condition for the development of rationality and of becoming a morally
responsible, autonomous agent. Atomists deny that it is. See id. at 190–91. On this view, society
logically succeeds the individual; that is, society is a creation of the individual, who created it for
the sake of his convenience and self-interest.
102. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, at 7.
103. See Josh Chafetz, The Political Animal and the Ethics of Constitutional Commitment, 124
HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 6–7 (2011).
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abilities from others, not only in the home, but in school, at play, and, as we
grow older, in continually widening social circles.
In all of these experiences, it is not only private values that are at work.
Because we are socially situated, human flourishing must include values
which themselves are social or public in character. The measure of a welllived life cannot be taken in terms of the individual in isolation from others.
The values of the private sphere are not sufficient to provide a complete
account of what exactly it means and what exactly is required for each
member of this most social of species to flourish in its characteristic way. A
full account requires inclusion of the public sphere as well. Indeed, as I have
already suggested, the two, being mutually supportive, can hardly be
separated when discussing human flourishing.
V. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE TOGETHER: TWO EXAMPLES
To illustrate the ways in which public and private values that constitute
human flourishing are symbiotic, this Part discusses two topics that have
prompted considerable controversy in property legal literature within the
past several years: the right of owners to exclude others and the
enforceability of homeowner association rules.
A. THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE: AUTONOMY AND SELF-CONSTITUTION
One of the more vibrant debates among property legal theorists in
recent years has been the role and scope of the right to exclude.104 Some
scholars have argued that the right to exclude is essential to the concept of
ownership.105 Some have even contended that it is the sine qua non of
ownership.106 Other scholars have argued that although the right to exclude
is important, it is only part of the complex core of ownership.107
Regardless of the centrality of the right to exclude to ownership, the
right to exclude illustrates how property law’s private ends require public
values to be realized. Virtually all property theorists agree that chief among
the private values that support the right to exclude is individual autonomy,
specifically personal autonomy.108 As Joseph Raz puts it, “the ruling idea
behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people should make their own

104. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 4, at 747, 801–10; Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the
Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998).
105. See, e.g., PENNER, supra note 72, at 68; Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property
Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 278–79 (2008); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two
Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S454–55 (2002).
106. See Merrill, supra note 104, at 752.
107. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY
THEORY 130–55 (2012); SINGER, supra note 56, at 39–44; LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF
PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 85–87, 89–90 (2003); Alexander, supra note 4, at 801–10.
108. On the distinction between personal autonomy and moral autonomy, see DAVID
JOHNSTON, THE IDEA OF A LIBERAL THEORY: A CRITIQUE AND RECONSTRUCTION 72–79 (1994).
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lives.”109 The autonomous person is the creator, at least partly, of the course
of her own life, controlling it by making a series of decisions about how her
life should go. On this view, these decisions all need to cohere with a
comprehensive life plan. People change their minds, develop different
tastes, and even entertain conflicting preferences. The point of personal
autonomy is that all of these ideas, tastes, and preferences are the creations
of the person who holds them.
The close relationship between private ownership and the right to
exclude more specifically is easy to see.110 As James Penner puts it, “the
freedom to determine the use of things is an interest of ours in part because
of the freedom it provides to shape our lives.”111 Penner provides one way of
linking the right to exclude with personal autonomy.112 In Penner’s analysis,
the link between freedom to use and freedom to shape our lives further
establishes the link between the right to exclude and autonomy, or
individual freedom. The right to use and right to exclude are, in his terms,
two sides of the same coin. As Penner explains, “[T]he natural link of the
right to exclude with use is simply that rightful exclusion of someone from a
thing will always be purposeful, i.e. having some purpose in respect of the
use to which the thing will be put.”113 At a minimum, it seems safe to say that
if we are able to use things exclusively, those things can be valuable tools
with which we can shape our lives, which is the very meaning of personal
autonomy. To the extent, then, that a “simple robust morality supporting
exclusion rights”114 exists, personal autonomy is surely part of that morality.
The familiar Tragedy of the Commons scenario115 illustrates the
connection between personal autonomy and the right to exclude. Here is
the scenario:
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each
herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the
commons. . . .

109. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369 (1986).
110. On the relationship between property and liberty in classical liberalism, see ALAN
RYAN, PROPERTY 35–49 (1987). On the relationship between autonomy, or liberty, and the right
to exclude, see PENNER, supra note 72, at 49–59.
111. PENNER, supra note 72, at 49.
112. I neither endorse nor reject Penner’s argument here. My purpose is simply to
illustrate one, albeit quite interesting, path to establishing the link between personal autonomy
and the right to exclude.
113. PENNER, supra note 72, at 70.
114. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1849, 1852 (2007).
115. The locus classicus citation is, of course, Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SCI. 1243 (1968). See also H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The
Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954) (applying common-property theory to the fishing
industry).
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As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain.
Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, “What is
the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?” This utility
has one negative and one positive component.
1) The positive component is a function of the increment of one
animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the
sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1.
2) The negative component is a function of the additional
overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the
effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the
negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is
only a fraction of -1.
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational
herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to
pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and
another. . . . But this is the conclusion reached by each and every
rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy.116
Hardin depicts the tragedy in utilitarian terms, but it is also a tragedy in
terms of personal autonomy, as he implicitly acknowledges. For not only
does aggregate society lose, but each individual herdsman suffers a loss of
personal autonomy with respect to the use of his cattle. True, in a superficial
sense he is free to choose whether to add another animal to the common for
grazing or desist from doing so in order to avoid overgrazing. But in a
deeper sense he does not have robust autonomy over this choice because the
inexorable logic of rational self-interest compels him to add another animal.
The right to exclude would free each herdsman from that logic and provide
him with robust autonomy. For then each herdsman would be free to decide
what use of every animal he owns and what use of his portion of the pasture
best fulfill the goals he has set for himself, without any interference from
others.117
This scenario of complete personal autonomy secured solely through
the right to exclude is radically incomplete, however. The right to exclude
alone does not enable individuals to realize their own autonomy. What
connects the right to exclude with personal autonomy are certain social
arrangements, arrangements over which the individual does not have sole
control. For example, as other property theorists have pointed out, neither
Hardin nor any of the other early theorists of the Tragedy of the Commons
explained how a group would change its ownership from a commons to

116. Hardin, supra note 115, at 1244.
117. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 35458
(1967).
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individual ownership with a right to exclude.118 Such a shift is a social
endeavor, requiring the consent of all members of the group. To be fully
realized, autonomy requires cooperation, a social, or public, value. The shift
from the commons to exclusive individual ownership cannot get off the
ground without social cooperation.
The same holds true of enforcement of the right to exclude. Suppose
that herdsman A owns, and owns exclusively, a parcel of grazing land. He
also owns, exclusively, a herd of cattle. What prevents other herdsmen from
grazing their cattle on A’s land or stealing his cattle? How can A enforce his
right to exclude them from his land? A might use self-help measures, of
course, but self-help can be costly. Not only must A erect fencing completely
around his land to keep his cattle in and others out, but he must police that
fencing periodically. It would be far cheaper for A if he could rely on a
collective system of enforceable rules, either as a supplement to self-help or
as a replacement for it, perhaps where the risk of a breach of the peace is
substantial. Such an enforcement system, like the creation of exclusion
rules, requires cooperation, a social value.
We can broaden this point about the right to exclude: The right to
exclude is meaningless, that is, it is conceptually incoherent in social
isolation. It acquires meaning only in the context of social relationships.119
The right to exclude is the hole in the doughnut. It exists only when placed
in the context of a society whose members are potential users of scarce
resources that others wish not to share for various reasons.120 Remove those
members and the need for the right to exclude, indeed, the very
intelligibility of such a right, disappears. In this sense, the right to exclude
conceptually depends upon society.
The point can be pushed more deeply. For the private law value that is
commonly thought to support the right to exclude—personal autonomy—
itself depends upon social and public values for conceptual coherence.
Specifically, personal autonomy, if we understand it as the capacity to shape
our own lives, requires and rests upon self-constitution as a public value. The
remainder of this section explains and defends this claim.
Recall that personal autonomy means that a person is able to shape his
own goals and to make his own decisions about which available options will
make his life go best for him. No one makes such choices in complete
isolation from others from birth through death. Everyone to varying degrees
depends on others for help in shaping those goals and making those
choices. The forms that such help take and the people from whom it comes
118. See James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
325, 33638 (1992).
119. Cf. Demsetz, supra note 117, at 347 (“In the world of Robinson Crusoe property rights
play no role.”).
120. Cf. PENNER, supra note 72, at 70 (“The right to use something so long as no one else
was using it or wanted to use it is equivalent to having no right of exclusion whatsoever.”).
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vary widely from person to person. Moreover, for each person, the forms
and sources of such help also vary over the course of our lives. We are not
always aware of this help, so it sometimes comes not only unrequested but so
subtly that we scarcely, if at all, notice. The sorts of help that I have in mind
range from the obvious, such as sustenance, care, training, companionship,
and other assistance from parents, teachers, friends, and neighbors, to
educational and career advice that parents and mentors give us, to less
conspicuous examples, such as political leaders who support legislation that
enables us to receive education or job training and others who make
decisions that present us with options otherwise unavailable to us, whether
we take advantage of those options or not. It is hard to imagine any single
choice or decision made during our lives that has not been influenced, if
not directly aided, by someone. Autonomous choices are always nested in
webs of social relationships. Truly individual choices do not exist.
Autonomy depends upon a richly social, cultural, and institutional
context for the presence of which the autonomous individual must rely on
others. From this perspective, another public value that both complements
and supports personal autonomy is membership. Individuals become
autonomous agents through membership in various social groups
throughout the course of their lives. The identity of the groups to which
individuals belong changes over time, but at no point in a person’s life is he
not a member of some group, usually many groups. Individuals are
inevitably dependent upon membership in groups, both chosen and not
chosen, to develop as free and rational agents. Personal autonomy is not
inherited; it is learned. We are not born as autonomous agents; rather, we
develop as autonomous beings through help from fellow group members.
At this point we can see how autonomy, a private value, draws support
from self-constitution, a public, or social, value. Earlier I defined selfconstitution as the identity and sense of purpose that a person constructs for
his life.121 Self-constitution is the process of interpreting oneself within a
social context. Because self-constitution always occurs within a social context,
it is dialogical in character.122 This is why autonomy cannot be adequately
understood apart from self-constitution.
So, how does this conception of personal autonomy as acquired
through dialogical self-constitution rather than inherited in isolation of
others relate to the right to exclude? There is always a tension in the process
of developing as an autonomous person: On the one hand, autonomy
depends upon being nested within various social groups; on the other hand,
the very fact of being so situated, i.e., within groups of other individuals,
itself creates a risk that our choices, or at least some of them, will be

121.
122.

See supra Part III.E.
See supra Part III.E.
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coerced, negating autonomy.123 The right to exclude mitigates this risk. As
James Penner has explained, the right to exclude is best understood in
negative terms, i.e., in terms of the in rem duties of others not to interfere
with one’s property.124 This way of thinking about the exclusion right has the
salutary effect of forcing attention on others rather than viewing the right to
exclude in social isolation. The right to exclude places duties on our fellow
members of the various groups to which we belong, however loosely, not to
interfere with the choices we make about the use of our property. It reflects
a conception of self-constitution that assures that the dialogic process of selfconstitution supports rather than undermines personal autonomy. It does so
by defining limits, vis-à-vis our property, on our fellow members’ interactions
with us to assure that those interactions only contribute to or enable the
development of our autonomy, or at least that their interactions with us do
not undermine our autonomous development. When asking, then, whether
another person who has had some interaction with an owner in the use of
her property, the relevant question to ask is always, does that person’s
interaction promote the owner’s autonomous development or does it
undermine it (or at least pose a significant risk of doing so)?
To see the effect of asking that question in different contexts, consider
first a simple hypothetical based on ordinary trespass law. Suppose that you
walk to work every day. The quickest and easiest route is to walk across a
back section of the lot on which my house, which is my only residence, is
located. There is another route you could take, one that involves no
trespassing, but it adds ten minutes to your walk. Besides, you think, the
section of my lot that you cross is apparently unused, and your walk would
be, as far as you can tell, unobtrusive. Should I, as the owner, nevertheless,
be able to exclude you from walking across my property? The law of trespass
says yes, and this is plainly the correct answer. Your use of my land, however
seemingly minimal, poses a non-trivial risk of undermining my development
as a person who is able to make and carry out his own options. Even putting
aside the risk that your continued use of my land as a right-of-way might
ripen into an easement of way, your use removes certain options that would
otherwise be open to me. If I cannot exclude you, I no longer have the
freedom, as the owner, to use that portion of my land as a garden or for
other development purposes. Your use has reduced my personal autonomy.
The right to exclude operates as a means of establishing a limit on the
social dimension of self-constitution such that self-constitution promotes
rather than impedes personal autonomy. It is particularly strong in
circumstances like my example where the property upon which the trespass
has occurred is the owner’s home. This situation involves another private
value, closely related to personal autonomy—personal security—and the

123.
124.

See RAZ, supra note 109, at 371.
PENNER, supra note 72, at 72−73.
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need to assure that self-constitution promotes rather than impedes personal
security is especially strong.
The same concern explains the result in the well-known right-to-exclude
case, Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.125 In that case, home owners, Lois and
Harvey Jacque, sued Steenberg Homes for damages for intentional trespass
to the Jacques’ land.126 Steenberg delivered a mobile home by plowing a
path across the Jacques’ snow-covered field despite strenuous protests from
the Jacques.127 Although other means of accessing the delivery location were
available, Steenberg used the path across the Jacques’ land because that was
the easiest route for it. The jury awarded the Jacques $1 in nominal damages
and $100,000 in punitive damages. On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held that if a jury awards nominal damages for intentional trespass,
the jury may also award punitive damages. The Jacques had good autonomybased reasons for excluding Steenberg Homes. If home-dwellers are to feel
secure in their own homes and to be uncoerced in making decisions
regarding what uses of their land will make their lives go best for them, they
must be free of intentional trespass. There are exceptional situations, of
course, such as the need for police or fire fighters to access a person’s home
in case of emergency, but the owner is not likely to object to entrance upon
her property under such circumstances.
Contrast Jacque with the famous Civil Rights Era “Lunch Counter”
cases.128 In those cases, young African Americans were arrested for and
convicted of criminal trespass when they refused to leave restaurants after
being requested to do so solely because of their race. The alleged
trespassers, who were protesting “whites-only” practices at lunch counters in
Southern retail stores, had asked to be served lunch but were refused and
were asked to leave. The defendants appealed their convictions arguing that
the convictions violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The cases raised the question whether state
action was involved or whether the discrimination was strictly private. In
each case the Court found state action.129
Would such cases be decided differently under the common law? Would
they be viewed the same as Jacque, with the restaurant owner having the right
to exclude anyone for whatever reason? Although there certainly are older
decisions that indicate otherwise,130 I suggest that it would be possible for a

125. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
126. Id. at 156.
127. Id.
128. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964);
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244
(1963).
129. Racial discrimination in restaurants is prohibited today under federal public
accommodation statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006).
130. See Singer, supra note 79, at 1351–52.
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court to hold that a restaurant owner does not have the right to exclude for
racially discriminatory reasons (or other reasons based on grounds of
invidious discrimination) under the private law of property. The public
values that nurture property’s private values push against the freedom of
owners of restaurants that are otherwise open to the public to exclude
members of the owners’ communities because of their race. Because the
owners have otherwise opened their restaurants to the general public, the
owner’s personal security is not at stake in this situation. Admitting African
American patrons in no way adds to the risk of the owners’ security beyond
the level of risk that the owners have already voluntarily accepted.
More fundamentally, the public value of self-constitution, which is
necessary for personal autonomy, resists recognition of the owners’ right to
exclude under these circumstances. I said earlier that self-constitution—the
process of interpreting oneself within a social context—is always dialogical in
character. I also said that self-constitution’s social dimension poses a risk of
undermining rather than promoting personal autonomy and that the
purpose of the right to exclude is to mitigate that risk. Where the interaction
between the owner and others is already in a social and public setting, one
that the owner has created, the owner has already assumed that risk by
creating the setting. In that situation, the right to exclude cannot perform
its risk-mitigation function. Requiring that the owner admit to his restaurant
patrons who he would otherwise admit but for their race does not
undermine his personal autonomy in any meaningful sense. He has already
made choices about his goals with respect to the use of his property, choices
that are immediately relevant to his right to exclude in this circumstance.
Hence, it is quite arguable that the public accommodation cases such as
these could have been decided the same way as they were on private law
grounds as by relying on constitutional or statutory provisions.131
B. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION RULES
Let us return to the case with which we began in the Introduction—
Donald Lamp and his American flag. What private and public values are at
stake in this dispute? Mr. Lamp expressly contracted not to display any flags
outside his apartment. He freely accepted a restriction on his freedom as a
homeowner that imposed on him certain obligations to members of his
residential community. Such a contractual obligation implicates a private
value that is central to property, namely, personal responsibility. This value
subsumes the legal principles surrounding freedom of contract and
contractual obligations, for, as the earlier discussion of this value
indicated,132 personal responsibility includes specific obligations that

131. Cf. Note, The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1993
(1989).
132. See supra Part II.E.
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individuals owe to others. Personal responsibility, then, obviously plays a
prominent role in disputes of this kind.
At one level, disputes such as Donald Lamp’s seem easily resolved by
looking at the matter through the lens of personal responsibility with its
concomitant legal principle of contractual obligation. Lamp signed an
agreement expressly restricting his freedom to display flags publicly, and he
is responsible for that contractual commitment. Yet if we examine the
matter a bit more deeply, it becomes apparent that personal responsibility
does not exhaust the list of private law values that are at stake in Lamp’s
dispute. For personal autonomy seems just as obviously involved in the
controversy. As I have already discussed, personal autonomy means being
the creator of one’s own ideas and preferences. To be sure, it does not mean
being immune from all involvement by others in one’s affairs; that is an
impossible situation. But it does mean that one’s plans, ideas, beliefs, and so
on, are one’s own, and not coerced by others.
One can certainly point out that, by signing the deed that included the
restrictive covenant, Mr. Lamp freely chose to restrict his own autonomy
with respect to displaying flags outside his apartment. From that perspective,
personal responsibility trumps any view of personal autonomy that suggests
tension between the two values in this case. Yet closely related to personal
autonomy in this situation is yet another value—self-expression. Sometimes
it is not enough simply to hold views that are the creations of one’s own
making; one feels compelled to express those views. On these occasions selfexpression supports, and even extends, personal autonomy. Lamp held
deeply personal beliefs and chose to use his position as homeowner to
express those beliefs publicly. The American flag symbolized beliefs that
Lamp considered expressive of his identity, and he wished to communicate
those beliefs with his neighbors in a particularly prominent and effective
way. Self-expression is an important value that does not merely augment
autonomy, but also enables the exercise of autonomy. From that perspective,
autonomy alone cannot justify Lamp’s waiver of self-expression.
One possible basis for justifying waiver is freedom of association.
Homeowner associations, like other voluntary associations, rely on freedom
of association for their integrity and, ultimately, their existence. If we lack
the freedom not only to choose the persons with whom we associate, but also
the ground rules by which our association abides, we cannot truly realize our
social character.
The connection between freedom of association and human sociability
suggests that freedom of association implicates a deeper value—community.
Conceptually, community is relevant here as a value, a regulative ideal, and
as a sociological phenomenon.133 As a regulative ideal, community operates
as a norm by which relationships may be regulated and something that we
133.

See Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 71, at xvii, xxviii–xxix.
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experience in our actual lives. Community is also a sociological concept. In
this sense it describes a group mode of living and social interaction with
others with whom we share particular interests and values. Homeowner
associations are frequently identified as communities in this latter,
sociological sense. Common interest developments often stress the club-like
quality of their living experience, explicitly emphasizing their group-like
character.134
As a value, community is essential to human flourishing, intimately
connected with our inherent sociality. As I indicated earlier,135 community is
constitutive of the self. It is necessary for the well-lived life because the self’s
very identity requires participation in social groups. In its relationship to
freedom of association, community seemingly serves a private function, but
community has two dimensions, public as well as private. Community
expresses relationships among humans that are at once individual and
social: individual because one does not sacrifice personal autonomy or selfidentity by entering into relationships, and social because self-identity
requires participation in social groups. Such relationships are relationships
that are voluntarily created by free and equal moral agents who wish to enter
into sharing experiences with others to enable their own lives to go well, i.e.,
to flourish.
At the same time, community, both as a value and as a social institution,
has a second dimension, one that is public in nature. As a social institution,
communities are nested, one within the other, including the state.
Recognition that the state is a community illuminates the fact that, in its role
as a social institution, community is both public and private. The same holds
true for community as a value. In this respect, community, as a value, is like
self-constitution, which, as we saw earlier,136 also has both an individual and
a social dimension. Community’s public side regulates the external relations
of communities as institutions, that is, their relations with each other,
especially the larger communities of which it is a part. The most important
of these larger communities is the state, for the state facilitates these smaller
communities through its rules of private ordering and fundamental norms
respecting rights of association, assembly, and the like.
The general point is that the categories of public and private are
unhelpful with respect to community. The line between them is as porous as
it is with respect to all of the values underlying property. Both institutionally
and normatively, community operates in a Janus-faced fashion, always
looking inward to itself and yet outward to the increasingly larger spheres of
social life with which it is inextricably enmeshed.

134.
135.
136.

See Alexander, supra note 76, at 9–12.
See supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.E.
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This double life of community is essential to a proper understanding of
community’s role as a value, or end, of property. It means that community’s
normative valence is not always clear. When other substantive values of small
institutional communities conflict with those of one or more of the larger
institutional communities within which the smaller communities are nested,
the normative implication of community does not unambiguously favor one
substantive value or the other. There is no trumping effect of community as
a value. What matters in these situations of nested communities with
conflicting substantive values is the nature of the relationship between the
institutional communities. What precisely does it mean to say, that is, that
the communities are nested, other than the facts that one is larger than the
other and that the smaller community is located in some relevant sense
within the larger one?
The previous discussion of self-constitution noted that self-constitution’s
social dimension poses a risk of undermining rather than promoting
personal autonomy.137 In the case of community, it is its private side that
poses this risk. The core of community’s private side is autonomy, the value
that supports the power of communities, as institutions, to exclude those
who do not share the constituent values and interests of particular
communities. That value—autonomy—confers upon communities power to
set the terms and conditions of membership in voluntary communities,
requiring members to subordinate their own personal autonomy for the
good of the larger institution’s values.
The public side of community, as a private law value, places a limit on
this subordination of personal autonomy and supports autonomy as one of
property’s ends by striking a balance between personal and institutional
autonomy. The basis for this limit is the fact that the state, as the community
that enables the creation of voluntary communities through its private legal
rules of contract and constitutional rights of assembly and free association,
and facilitates the operation of those communities through its legal system,
is literally constitutive of them. As the foundational community that makes
the existence of smaller, nested communities possible, the state sets the basic
parameters for their membership within the foundational, constitutive
community. Those parameters are set by the state’s own foundational values,
the values of which it is normatively constituted. Among these foundational
values is personal autonomy, augmented by its ancillary value of selfexpression. These values are constitutive of the state as a political
community. Self-expression, which is manifested, among other ways, in the
right of freedom of speech, is essential to the existence of a particular kind
of political community, and for that reason the state treats it as fundamental.
Because self-expression is so existential, it cannot be subordinated to
conflicting values of smaller voluntary communities. This is not a matter of
137.

See supra Part III.E.
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state action or public law. The priority of the state’s fundamental values,
values such as personal autonomy and self-expression, over the values of
nested voluntary communities, is established by private law, through its
values.
In cases such as Mr. Lamp’s, the public side of community as a private
law value resists recognition of the right of voluntary groups, including those
created by private agreement, to subordinate values that are existential to
the particular kind of political community that the state represents to the
group’s own conflicting values. Hence, the question whether Lamp waived
his right to display the American flag in front of his condominium unit is
moot because, properly understood, the private law of property makes the
value of self-expression non-waivable as applied to such forms of selfexpression as political speech.138
Of course, there are limits to this principle of subordination. It applies
only to those values that are truly existential to the particular kind of
political community that the state represents. Hence, in the case of
homeowner associations, not all instances of self-expression or other acts of
personal autonomy are or should be beyond the group’s power to regulate.
So, for example, a homeowner association covenant prohibiting outdoor
displays of plastic pink flamingoes is valid.139 Such an aesthetic regulation,
although restricting self-expression, in no way implicates values that are
existential to the substantive character of the larger political community.
The same will be true of the vast majority of homeowner association rules.
Group autonomy, which promotes the integrally related values of free
association and sociability, should normally prevail because it is supported
by community’s private aspect and does not interfere with its public
dimension.
CONCLUSION
Property’s ultimate end is human flourishing. Because human
flourishing is itself comprised of multiple ends, property’s ends are multiple
and varied. These ends, values of private law, have both private and public
dimensions, and private law itself negotiates the relationship between these
two aspects of its values. The relationship between the public and private
often turns out to be supportive rather than in conflict. The values that are
part of property’s public dimension in many instances are necessary to

138. This is essentially the position adopted in the Restatement (Third) of Property. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (2000). As to the specific issue of the
American flag, the primacy of the individual’s autonomy is now codified by federal statute. See 4
U.S.C. § 5 (2012) (“A condominium association . . . may not adopt or enforce any policy . . .
that would restrict or prevent a member of the association from displaying the flag of the
United States on residential property . . . .).
139. Such a restrictive covenant doubtless would be valid under section 3.1 of the
Restatement (Third) of Property.
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support, facilitate, and enable property’s private ends. Hence, any account
of public and private values that depicts them as categorically separate is
grossly misleading. One important consequence of this insight is that many
legal disputes that appear to pose a conflict between the private and public
spheres or that seemingly require the involvement of public law can and
should, in fact, be resolved on the basis of private law—the law of property—
alone. Private law turns out to be much richer than conventional wisdom
recognizes.

